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SIMILARLY SITUATED UNDER THE SUNDAY
CLOSING LAW
The Supreme Court in 1961 upheld the constitutionality of Sun-
day closing laws making classifications reasonably related to the legis-
lative purpose of providing a day of work stoppage and rest.' Sub-
sequent attacks 2 upon these laws have focused on the constitutional
problems posed by their potential for discriminatory enforcement.
That is,
whether in a community in which there is general disregard
of a particular law with the acquiescence of the public authori-
ties, the authorities should be allowed sporadically to select
a single defendant or a single class of defendants for prose-
cution because of personal animosity or some other illegiti-
mate reasonY
The rationale supporting these attacks derives from the doctrine
originating in Yick Wo v. Hopkins:'
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as prac-
'Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961). But see Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 529-30,
129 N.W.2d 475, 482-83 (1964) (concurring opinion) (The "real purpose [of such
laws] is to protect narrow commercial interests, influenced by the fierce competition
between the discount store and the downtown merchants."); cf. Skag-Way Dep't
Stores v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d 28 (1966).
2 See Moss v. Hornig, 314 F2d 89 (2d Cir. 1963); Whitney Stores, Inc. v.
Summerford, 280 F. Supp. 406 (D.S.C. 1968); Epstein v. Maddox, 277 F. Supp.
613 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1968); Zayre of Georgia, Inc.
v. City of Atlanta, 276 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ga. 1967) ; Gibson Products Co. v. Lowe,
440 S.W.2d 793 (Ky. 1969) ; City of Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky.
1966); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S2d 128
(1962) ; People v. Tornatore, 46 Misc. 2d 908, 261 N.Y.S2d 474 (Poughkeepsie City
Ct. 1965); People v. Paine Drug Co., 39 Misc. 2d 824, 241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Monroe
County Ct. 1963), rev'd, 22 App. Div. 2d 156, 254 N.Y.S2d 492 (1964), aff'd, 16
N.Y.2d 503, 208 N.E.2d 176, 260 N.Y.S.2d 444, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 838 (1965);
People v. Parn, 38 Misc. 2d 296, 238 N.Y.S.2d 363 (New York City Crim. Ct. 1963),
aff'd, 43 Misc. 2d 357, 250 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. T. 1964) ; City of South Euclid v.
Bondy, 192 N.E2d 139 (S. Euclid, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1963); Bargain City U.S.A., Inc.
v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
3 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 17-18, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128,
133 (1962).
4 118 U.S. 356 (1886). A municipal ordinance rendered unlawful the operation
of a laundry without the consent of a board of supervisors unless the building housing
the operation was constructed of brick or stone. Only Chinese laundry operators-
and one non-Chinese operator-were denied the required permission and arrested for
violation of the ordinance. Although not passing on the validity of the ordinance,
the Court held that the discriminatory refusal to issue permits denied the Chinese
petitioners equal protection.
(190)
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tically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
5
To substantiate a denial of equal protection based on discriminatory
enforcement requires more than proof of mere nonenforcement of a
statute against others,' mere laxity of enforcement,7 or the "conscious
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement." 8 Rather, the enforce-
ment must be shown to contain an "element of intentional or pur-
poseful discrimination." '
In Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Marietta,'" three retail
department stores, one intervening, sought to enjoin the cities of
Marietta and Smyrna, Georgia, from discriminatory enforcement of
the Georgia Sunday closing law." Plaintiffs contended that they were
denied equal protection of the law because threats of enforcement and
revocation of their business licenses were directed against them but
not against other businesses competitively selling all or some of the
same items.
The district court in an unreported opinion issued a temporary
restraining order,' and subsequently a nearly identical preliminary
injunction," prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the closing
5 Id. at 373-74. Similar language appears in Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield,
247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918):
The purpose of the equal protection clause . . . is to secure every person
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly
constituted agents.
6 See, e.g., Moss v. Hornig, 314 F2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
7 See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 213 Ore. 619, 637, 325 P.2d 794, 802 (1958).
8 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
9 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). The discrimination must be
"[r]ooted in design and not derive merely from error or fallible judgement." Id. at
15 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The burden of proof on one alleging discriminatory
enforcement is unquestionably heavy. See, e.g., People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co.,
16 App. Div. 2d 12, 19, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 135 (1962).
10 416 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970).
11 GA. CODE AN. § 26-6905 (1935). 1968 GA. AcTs AND RESOLUTIOiS 1249, 1337,
§ 2 enacted the Criminal Code and recodified § 26-6905 as § 26-9908.
Any person who shall pursue his business or the work of his ordinary calling
on the Lord's day, works of necessity or charity only excepted, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
12 The Fifth Circuit quoted the district court order:
[Dlefendants . . . are temporarily restrained from enforcing Section 26-6905
of the Code of Georgia of 1933 in a discriminatory manner and from revoking
business licenses by reason of the violation of said Code Section in a dis-
criminatory manner. This . . . order is not intended to prohibit the enforce-
ment of Section 26-6905 . . . nor to prohibit the revocation of business
licenses by reason of its violation, but rather it orders that such enforce-
ment be on a nondiscriminatory basis ....
416 F.2d at 252-53.
The order is reproduced in full in Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 20, Zayre
of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Marietta, 397 U.S. 918 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Petitioners' Brief].
13 Reproduced in Petitioners' Brief 20-22.
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law and from revoking business licenses in a discriminatory manner.
After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain enforcement of the injunction,
plaintiffs sought further relief through contempt proceedings, alleging
that other persons, professions, and businesses '4 not covered by the
statutory exemption for "works of necessity or charity" " were per-
mitted to stay open and conduct business in violation of the statute.
The court orally declined to issue a contempt citation, stating that the
injunction related only to discriminatory enforcement between com-
peting merchants, and adhered to this interpretation in its subsequent
denial of plaintiffs' formal motion to amend and broaden the pre-
liminary injunction already in effect. 6
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of this motion, agreeing
with the district court that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a further
denial of equal protection.' It found that the principle of Yick Wo
was inapplicable because the plaintiffs had demonstrated no discrimina-
tion between businesses similarly situated beyond that justifying the
preliminary injunction.'" But the court was able to find an absence
of discrimination only by construing the phrase "similarly situated"
to encompass only those businesses "in direct competition" '" with the
plaintiffs.
Judge Boyle dissented, arguing that the court had misconstrued
the phrase and that a determination of which businesses or individuals
are similarly situated must be made with reference to the applicable
14 Radio stations, newspapers, real estate agents, antique merchants, theaters,
pet shops, florists, funeral directors, television repairmen, ministers, and aircraft
manufacturing were noted. See id. 24.
15 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6905 (1935).
16 Petitioners' Brief 23-26. The order granting the preliminary injunction, how-
ever, contains no explicit limitation on the discrimination prohibited. In summarizing
the evidence of nonenforcement, the district court noted the Sunday operations of
not only drug stores selling competitive consumer goods but also drive-in groceries.
Id. 21. One reason for the court's refusal to grant the requested relief may be that
plaintiffs referred in their original complaint only to businesses selling competitive
merchandise. In denying the motion for expanded relief, the district court stated
that "in the suit as originally filed, no such relief was sought or granted." Id. 24.
The court appeared to ignore its holding in a prior injunction claim against the city
of Atlanta. In Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 276 F. Supp. 892 (N.D.
Ga. 1967), the court issued an order in terms substantially similar to those in the
instant case. But the court's recitation of the stipulated facts indicated that the stores
affected by the order were not limited to those in direct economic competition with
the plaintiff.
1' The court of appeals quoted with approval the district court's arguments for
denying the plaintiffs' motion to enlarge the scope of the injunction:
"[B]y their motion to enlarge the plaintiffs do not complain of discriminatory
enforcement against them. What they do complain of is non-enforcement
against other professions and trades in which plaintiffs are apparently not
engaged. There is, of course, a great difference between discriminatory
enforcement of a statute and non-discriminatory non-enforcement. ...
"Such being the situation, it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs have
standing to assert the charges contained in their motion."
416 F2d at 253.
18 Id. at 253-54.
i9 Id.
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statute. Because the closing law applied by its terms to "[a]ny per-
son," those similarly situated were "all persons pursuing their regular
business or calling" on Sunday, unless engaged in works of necessity
or charity. Thus the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction pro-
hibiting "any discrimination whatsoever" in the enforcement of the
statute, regardless of the absence of direct competition between busi-
nesses.
This Comment contends that the court erred in its restrictive
reading of the phrase "similarly situated," and that the approach and
result of the dissent are more consonant with sound constitutional law.
Had the court granted the expanded relief sought by the plaintiffs,
it would have reflected more accurately the state legislature's intent
and perhaps encouraged a reevaluation of the Sunday closing law.
I. THE DEFINITION OF "SIMILARLY SITUATED"
Given that plaintiffs had been singled out for prosecution from
other businesses open on Sunday,"- the court should have looked to
the class covered by the statutory prohibition to determine the lawful-
ness of this selective enforcement.
[T]he concept of equal protection has been traditionally
viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons stand-
ing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned
or challenged.'
The governmental action challenged in Zayre was the enforcement of
the Sunday closing law. A determination of the class of persons and
businesses "standing in the same relation" to this action must be
based upon the law's intended scope.' The declared policy of the
20 Id. at 254-55 (Boyle, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that certain of
the businesses allowed to remain open on Sunday had been held by Georgia courts
to be subject to the Sunday closing law. Id. at 255. To demonstrate the broad
sweep of the law, the dissent quoted the Supreme Court of Georgia:
It [the Sunday closing law] applies alike to all business, vocations, and
occupations. .... It is universal, and rigidly impartial, making no discrimi-
nation whatever . . . .It puts no obstacle in the way of trade or its opera-
tions which is not encountered by every other class of worldly business or
employment.
Id. at 255 n2 (quoting Hennington v. State, 90 Ga. 396, 399, 17 S.E. 1009, 1010
(1892), aff'd sub nor. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896)).
21 Issuance of the preliminary injunction required proof of such discrimination.
See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra. For a discussion of the problems in proving
discriminatory enforcement, see Comment, The Right to Nouiscriminatory Enforce-
mert of State Penal Laws, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1103, 1122-30 (1961).
22 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
23 See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944) ("The unlawful administration
. . . of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in the unequal application to
those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless
there is . . . present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.")
(emphasis added); Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F2d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 1969) (Equal
protection was denied by giving ballot preferences to certain candidates for public
office because "[a]ll the candidates were entitled, auder tie state law, to be treated
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Georgia legislature is clear from the statute: with the exception of
works of charity and necessity, all business activity and ordinary work
is to cease on Sunday. The statute nowhere distinguishes between
competitive and noncompetitive businesses, the distinction relied upon
by the Fifth Circuit in upholding the district court's refusal to enlarge
the scope of the injunction. Because all businesses stand in the same
relation to the statute, they are entitled to uniform, nondiscriminatory
treatment under its directive.
The Zayre court's erroneous analysis is evidenced by the following
language, quoted with apparent approval by the court, from the district
court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to expand the preliminary injunc-
tion:
"So far as appears . . . the plaintiffs themselves, if they care
to do so, may [on Sunday] operate a funeral parlor, a radio
station, a pet shop, a florist shop or a business in any of the
other categories complained of on the same basis as all other
persons." I
Behind this limitation of the equal protection clause to competitive
businesses lies an incorrect interpretation of Yick Wo. The Zayre
court relied on the fact that Yick Wo involved discrimination between
virtually identical laundries in the enforcement of a statute.25 But
the persons similarly situated in Yick Wo were so nearly identical be-
cause of the narrow scope of the statute itself: it applied to laundry
operators exclusively. 6  The Yick Wo result is thus consistent with
a rationale emphasizing the scope of the statute itself in defining
"similarly situated." Competitive similarities between businesses
should not have claimed the court's attention in Zayre, where the
statute encompassed within its prohibition "any person." This inter-
pretation of Yick Wo is reflected in Judge Boyle's conclusion:
The fact that a retail merchant is more "similarly situated"
with other retail merchants, for example, than he is with a
florist or a pet shop operator, does not compel the conclusion
that the retail merchant and the florist are not "similarly
situated" as far as this statute is concerned. To hold other-
wise is to read Yick Wo v. Hopkins . . . too narrowlyY'
alike.") (emphasis added); LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law-
Part I, 1962 Wis. L. Rxv. 104, 135 (impermissible classifications include those "bear-
ing unequally on persons similarly situated with respect to the subject inatter of the
law") (emphasis added). See also Distelhorst v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 58 F.
Supp. 334, 335 (S.D. Iowa 1944), appeal dismnissed by consent of parties, 150 F2d
541 (8th Cir. 1945) (In determining whether employees were similarly situated for
purposes of bringing an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, similarity
"with reference to their employer" is sufficient despite differences in the nature of
employments.) (emphasis added).
24416 F2d at 253.
25 d. at 253-54.
2 See 118 U.S. at 357-58.
27416 F.2d at 255 (emphasis added).
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In Davis v. Board of Education,"8 cited by the Zayre court in
support of its equal protection theory,29 the Fifth Circuit described an
approach consistent with that urged herein. The court affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint of certain school children and their parents
seeking to force the state to allow the transfer of the children and
corresponding state funds from one county school system to another.
The court held that to establish a denial of equal protection based
upon the allegedly discriminatory transfer denial, the plaintiffs had to
show that they were similarly situated with those for whom transfer
was permitted30 To prove such a similar situation, it was necessary
to establish either that the plaintiffs had satisfied the provisions of
the statute governing such procedures, or that others had not satisfied
the provisions but were granted permission to transfer nevertheless.3 '
In determining which persons were similarly situated, the court thus
looked to the statute itself and its intended scope.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a case practically on all fours
with Zayre, correctly interpreted Yick Wo and enjoined the defendant
city from enforcing a broad Sunday closing law against the plaintiff
department store unless such enforcement was part of a just and equal
program of statutory enforcement against all known violators, "some
of which sell many of the same types of merchandise" as the plaintiff.Y2
In a more recent decision, 3 the same court reversed the dismissal of
a complaint seeking uniform enforcement of a Sunday closing law
against all offenders. The court did, however, affirm dismissal of that
portion of the complaint alleging discrimination based on the enforce-
ment of the closing law against the plaintiff and the nonenforcement
of the prohibition against hunting on Sunday. The court noted that
merchants and hunters are properly in different classes and are "so
designated and treated in the statute." 34
In sum, the Zayre court failed to recognize that, when the
administration of a statute fair on its face is challenged, the deter-
mination of parties similarly situated must be made with reference to
the scope of the statute involved. 5
28408 F2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1969).
29416 F2d at 254.
30 408 F2d at 1015.
31Id. at 1016.
32 Ashland v. Heck's, Inc., 407 S.W2d 421, 421-22 (Ky. 1966) (emphasis added).
The court also relied upon Covington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040
(1933), in which a municipal ordinance prohibiting the placing of merchandise on
sidewalks was enforced only against plaintiff and other storekeepers and not against
farmers, "hucksters," and "other market people." The Covington court relied on
Yick Wo to enjoin the city's enforcement of the ordinance in a discriminatory manner,
and treated the above classes as similarly situated.
33 Gibson Products Co. v. Lowe, 440 S.W2d 793 (Ky. 1969).
3 4 Id. at 795 (emphasis added).
35 See Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 557 (1947)
("Yick Wo's case, as other cases have demonstrated, was tested by the language of
the law there considered and the administration there shown.").
1970]
196 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Although the opinion is silent on this point, Zayre may be inter-
preted as a recognition of the broad scope afforded the doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion. 6 The court never mentioned the prosecutor's
discretion, but it was apparently untroubled by disparate treatment of
"persons" under the statute, and at the close of its opinion it did
remark:
If appellants are contending . . . that they should be
immunized from prosecution under the statute unless and
until other violators are brought to justice, then their attack
also must fail under the circumstances here.
The federal courts have no general supervisory power over
the operation of state and local governments.37
If indeed the court had prosecutorial discretion in mind, its reliance
was misplaced, for a reasonable allowance for such discretion would
legitimatize neither the discriminatory enforcement action challenged
in Zayre nor potential discriminatory action left unchecked by the
limited restrictions on enforcement enunciated by the court.
Some courts have held that the prosecutor's discretion in enforcing
a statute is as broad as the legislature's in enacting it, and that the
prosecutor may therefore make any classification which would be per-
missible if made by the legislature." It has been suggested " that
this conclusion flows from Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Com-
missioners,° in which the Supreme Court upheld against an attack
based on Yick Wo the Louisiana pilotage law pursuant to which the
36 See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 401 F2d 915, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
See generally LaFave, supra note 23; LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the
Law-Part II, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 179.
37 416 F.2d at 254.
STalrv. City of Pine Bluff, 266 Ark. 309, 289 S.W2d 679, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 894 (1956). The court held that because a Sunday closing statute applicable
only to grocery stores would have been valid, the enforcement of a general closing
law against such stores exclusively did not deny equal protection to a convicted
grocer. In Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944, 953 (E.D. Pa. 1959)
(3-judge court), aff'd, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), the district court stated as a "controlling
constitutional principle" that discriminatory behavior by administrative officers does
not deny equal protection "unless equivalent action by the state legislature would
. ... " In affirming, the Supreme Court did not discuss the existence or validity
of such a principle.
39 Comment, supra note 21, at 1118.
40 330 U.S. 552 (1947). Another possible basis for such a position, cited in
Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 179 F. Supp. 944, 953 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (3-judge court),
aff'd, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), is the following statement from Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1, 11: "If the action of the [State Canvassing] Board is official action it is
subject to constitutional infirmity to the same but no greater extent than if the
action were taken by the state legislature." In context, however, this language
appears to be used in a quantitative rather than a qualitative sense to indicate that
the illegality of the Board's action under its governing statute neither adds to nor
detracts from its constitutional validity.
[Vo1.119:190
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state governor appointed pilots from those satisfying an apprenticeship
requirement. Under the law, incumbent pilots selected apprentices,
and plaintiffs complained that only friends and relatives of the pilots
were selected. The Court upheld the scheme because in view of the
unique status of the institution of pilotage in Louisiana history it
could not determine that the entire selection procedure was not reason-
ably related to the legitimate objective of a safe and efficient pilotage
system.
4
1
But Kotch should be distinguished from the instant situation.
Kotch involved discrimination in the process of awarding licenses,
not the discriminatory imposition of criminal penalties, and the admin-
istrative discretion there challenged was expressly conferred by the
statute itself. Most important, the Court apparently treated the entire
system as legislative in nature.'
Even if the permissible scope of discretion exercised by those
charged with the enforcement of the law is more restricted than the
legislature's discretion in enacting the law, "there remains an area of
unequal enforcement occasioned by discriminatory judgment of the
police and prosecutors that is not violative of the equal protection
clause." " Prosecutorial discretion or selectivity in enforcement is
often necessary because limitations on funds and manpower prohibit
the enforcement of all laws against all offenders.44 The crucial ques-
tion is the proper breadth of this discretion. As one court has stated:
Selective enforcement may be justified when the meaning or
constitutionality of the law is in doubt and a test case is
needed to clarify the law or establish its validity. Selective
enforcement may also be justified when a striking example
or a few examples are sought in order to deter other vio-
lators, as part of a bona fide rational pattern of general
enforcement, in the expectation that general compliance will
follow and that further prosecutions will be unnecessary. It
is only when the selective enforcement is designed to dis-
criminate against the persons prosecuted, without any inten-
tion to follow it up by general enforcement against others,
that a constitutional violation may be found.45
4 1330 U.S. at 563-64.
4 The Court stated that it could only assume that the Louisiana legislature had
weighed the possibility of the evils of nepotism against the need for a closely knit
pilotage system and had decided in favor of the latter. Id. Subsequent cases have
cited Kotch as authority for sustaining a legislative classification if reasonably related
to a valid state objective. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 n.24 (1970) ; Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 636 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
43 Comment, supra note 21, at 1119.
44 Cf. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
45 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128,
136 (1962). See also Note, Discriminatory Law Enforcement and Equal Protectiol
From the Law, 59 YALE L.J. 354, 357 (1950).
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So far as appears from the opinion in Zayre, the prosecutor's
decision to enforce the Georgia law selectively was not supported by
any of the criteria noted above. The meaning of the Georgia Sunday
closing law is free from doubt. The selection of plaintiffs and other
retail department stores cannot be viewed as part of a rational pattern
of general law enforcement in view of the universality of the legis-
lative command. 6 The selective deployment of limited resources
among various laws, or against some persons covered by a particular
law, may be necessary to effectuate a statutory policy. But such
selective enforcement is qualitatively different from the action taken
against Zayre and its co-plaintiffs-action which, in effect, usurped
the legislative function and frustrated the declared policy of the legis-
lative program.47
In his dissent, Judge Boyle recognized the validity in many
instances of prosecutorial discretion but cautioned that it is not the
prosecutor's "prerogative to carve out exceptions to statutes of uni-
versal or general application." 48 In fact, the problem implicit in
granting discretion to the prosecutor in Sunday closing law situations
may be the product of doubts about the extent of a consensus as to
the validity of those laws.
The inequality tolerated by this judicial hands-off policy is
particularly acute where a law has ceased to reflect contem-
porary public opinion: it is then that enforcement is sporadic
and most likely to be discriminatory.49
4 6 But see Skag-Way Dep't Stores v. City of Omaha, 179 Neb. 707, 140 N.W.2d
28 (1966).
47 But see Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439
(1962) (by implication). The argument implicit in Bargain City, in which a closing
law was admittedly enforced only against large retail establishments, is that because
such establishments interfere most with the legislative policy of securing a day of
rest and relaxation, exclusive enforcement, necessitated by limited resources, best
effectuates the statutory purpose.
But there is some question whether even the legislature could make such a
classification. Compare Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Wood, 177 Neb. 515, 129 N.W2d
475 (1964), with Bertera's Hopewell Foodand, Inc. v. Masters, 428 Pa. 20, 236
A.2d 197 (1967), appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 597 (1968). In any event, the Georgia
legislature has made no such statutory declaration of purpose and, if enforcement
against plaintiffs was based on the above reasoning, the initial nonenforcement against
direct competitors indicates that this degree of "purpose-effectuating" discretion
should have been denied the Georgia law enforcement officials. Further,
sporadic enforcement can hardly be explained by a desire to effectuate the
law's purpose, since the law, vitiated to the extent of its nonenforcement,
has ceased to exert any significant effect on the pattern of community
behavior.
Note, supra note 45, at 354 n.4.
48 416 F.2d at 255.
[T]his Court is of the opinion that neither [McGowan nor Two Guys] stands
for the proposition that municipalities may choose to carve out exceptions
via selective enforcement of the statute.
Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. Atlanta, 276 F. Supp. 892, 894 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
49 Note, supra note 45, at 354.
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CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit's refusal to expand the preliminary injunction
perhaps reflects its conclusion that "federal courts have no general
supervisory power over the operation of state and local govern-
ments." '0 The preliminary injunction did alleviate the most severe
hardship-economic advantage to their competitors-of the discrimi-
nation against the plaintiffs. The court may have feared that expansion
of the injunction would result in increased federal supervision of state
enforcement mechanisms.
But however laudatory the Fifth Circuit's reluctance to oversee
the operation of local government, the court should not have deemed
this consideration controlling. First, it resulted in an interpretation
which ignored the statute's own conception of persons similarly situated
while giving tacit approval to an overly expansive concept of selective
enforcement. 5 Second, granting the expanded relief sought pursuant
to the statute would have had the incidental yet desirable effect of
prompting legislative reevaluation of the stated justifications52 for
the Sunday closing law. In accordance with such a grant of expanded
injunctive relief, the statute would be enforced either uniformly,
against all types of businesses and occupations, or not at all.53 In
either instance, public opinion and reaction, whether for or against the
enforcement decision, might well provide intelligible guidelines for
the legislature to follow in considering this traditional area of penal
legislation.54
5o416 F2d at 254. The district court, in granting the preliminary injunction,
noted that "the Court does not desire to interfere in such matters. It is indeed
unpleasant and burdensome to the Court to be required to do so." Petitioners' Brief
22.
51 One commentator has noted the danger posed by statutes vesting administrative
officers with extensive discretion. Such a statute
injects into the governmental wheel so much free play that in the practical
course of its operation it is likely to function erratically-responsive to whim
or discrimination unrelated to any specific determination of need by the
responsible policy-making organs of society-and to result in a significant
number of impermissible public-versus-private-interest resolutions .
Note, The Void-for-Vagueiess Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
67, 90 (1960). The same potential for abuse is inherent in nonstatutory prosecutorial
discretion.
52 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450 (1961).
63 Such uniform treatment would not require that every violator be detected and
prosecuted, as the district court, in denying the motion for expanded relief, Petitioners'
Brief 26, assumed, but only that a rational pattern for such action, geared to effec-
tuate compliance by all covered by the statute, be established.
54
[A] court injunction against the discriminatory enforcement would tend
to bolster the "necessary" law by compelling enforcement officials either to
generalize their operations or face inquiry and discipline at the hands of an
exasperated legislature.
Note, supra note 45, at 359.
